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Jump bidding is a commonly observed phenomenon that involves bidders in ascending
auctions submitting bids higher than required by the auctioneer. Such behavior is typically
explained as due to irrationality or to bidders signaling their value. We present ﬁeld data
that suggests such explanations are unsatisfactory and construct an alternative model in
which jump bidding occurs due to strategic concerns and impatience. We go on to examine
the impact of jump bidding on the outcome of ascending auctions in an attempt to resolve
some policy disputes in the design of ascending auctions.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
The recent popular ﬁeld use of ascending auctions for such things as auctioning spectrum
licenses and other government assets has been justiﬁed by claims that they will yield highly
eﬃcient outcomes. This claim is derived in part from the well-known proof that, in single unit
private value settings, it is a dominant strategy for all bidders to stay in the auction until their
value is reached and then drop out. The result is that the winner is invariably the bidder with
the highest value. The problem with generalizing this result to ﬁeld auctions is that this proof
only holds for the clock version of the ascending auction, yet the clock version of the ascending
auction is not common among ﬁeld implementations.
The rules of an ascending clock auction involve all bidders beginning the auction being
“in” and then watching as a continuous clock raises the price of the object. The only decision
a bidder has to make is when to irrevocably exit the auction. There are four main diﬀerences
in the auction rules between the typical ﬁeld versions of the ascending auction and the clock
version. The ﬁrst is the use of a sequential property right in which a bidder places a bid to
become the standing high bidder and maintains that right until someone chooses to submit a
higher bid to displace them as high bidder. This structure leads to the second diﬀerence which
is that bidders must now choose when and how much to bid at various points in the auction
rather than only when to drop out. This expanded strategy space in turn leads to a diﬀerence
in information sets. In the clock auction, a bidder knows how many other bidders are still “in”
while in non-clock auctions a bidder only knows that he or someone else is the standing high
bidder. A third common diﬀerence is the use of a discrete price space rather than a continuous
one. The fourth diﬀerence is the use of a minimum required bid increment.
These changes to the auction structure invalidate the use of the clock auction strategy of
bidders just remaining in the auction until their value is reached at a base level because this does
not constitute a completely speciﬁed strategy in the non-clock setting. It is, however, commonly
thought that the analog to the clock auction strategy, namely a bidder being willing to bid
the minimum increment until his value is reached and then ceasing to bid further (sometimes
called “straightforward bidding”) is still a dominant strategy or at least a Nash equilibrium
strategy when the clock is removed. Statements asserting this can be found throughout the
auction literature and typically take the form of simply asserting that there is no diﬀerence in
the equilibrium strategy between the clock and non-clock auctions, as in the following:
2This is the ‘. . .progressive auction, in which bids are freely made and announced
until no purchaser wishes to make any further higher bid’ (Vickrey (1961), p. 14).
. . Therefore, the strategy of remaining in the bidding competition as long as the
b i do nt h eﬂoor does not exceed the bidder’s value for the object, and of dropping
out as soon as it does exceed value, is a dominant strategy. ( Cox et al. (1982) p.
2a n dp .8 )
and
In the English auction, the price is successively raised until only one bidder remains.
This can be done by having an auctioneer announce prices, or by having bidders
call the bids themselves. . . the dominant strategy is to remain in the bidding
until the price reaches the bidder’s own valuation. (McAfee and McMillan (1987)
p. 702 and p. 708)
We do not intend to single out the authors of these quotations as particular oﬀenders in this
regard but rather our intent is to show that this mistake is very easy to make even by the most
careful and rigorous researchers. The frequency with which this mistake is made has led to a
general belief in the existence of a folk theorem that the clock strategy translates cleanly to
the non-clock setting. We have even found one paper, Kamecke (1998), that also asserts that
this to be a popular belief and attempts to verify it, but eventually shows that the dominant
strategy criterion is “not very eﬀective in many English auction models.” We will show that
in a standard symmetric independent private values environment, straightforward bidding is
not even typically part of a Nash equilibrium in the non-clock ascending auction, much less a
dominant strategy.
In addition to constructing the equilibria of non-clock ascending auctions, we intend to ana-
lyze the properties of the equilibria with an eye towards the design of ﬁeld auctions. Demange
et al. (1986) and Milgrom (2000) have previously been used as theoretical justiﬁcations for
the ﬁeld use of ascending auctions as both show that if bidders were to bid straightforwardly
in multiple unit auctions, the eﬃcient outcome would be approximately achieved. Neither
paper, however, shows that straightforward bidding is an equilibrium strategy. The problem
with using these papers as a basis for the design of ﬁeld auctions is that if bidders do not
bid straightforwardly, their results do not apply. The evidence indicates quite strongly that
3bidders do not as shown by ﬁeld data reported in Börgers and Dustmann (2001), Plott and
Salmon (2004), and Easley and Tenorio (2001). The the ability of ascending auctions to gener-
ate eﬃcient outcomes is therefore in doubt because we have no theoretical basis to claim that
eﬃcient outcomes can be achieved in the absence of straightforward bidding.
Therefore we will be particularly interested in determining what “nice” properties of as-
cending auctions are maintained in the presence of equilibrium based jump bidding. This is
important beyond mere tying up of theoretical loose ends because there are existing prior claims
that deviation from straightforward bidding is detrimental to auction performance. This claim
has ﬁrst appeared in Cybernomics (2000) and has been made at least twice more in Banks
et al. (2003) (BOPRS) and Porter et al. (2003). As stated in BOPRS, the claim is that “jump
bidding is encouraged by impatient bidders who desire to speed up the pace of the auction
but sacriﬁce price and eﬃciency.” This claim is based on experiments with single and multiple
unit ascending auctions found in Coppinger et al. (1980) and McCabe et al. (1991). Because
this claim has been made speciﬁcally in regard to the design of ﬁeld ascending auctions, it is
important to inquire as to its validity. The design and analysis of the model in this paper will
provide a theoretical investigation in regard to the internal consistency of the claim while a
follow-up paper, Isaac et al. (2003), will test the issue empirically.
Section 2 contains an overview of the back ground of both ﬁeld data and prior theoretical
explanations of jump bidding. Section 3 develops a model intended to account for jump bidding
and section 4 contains the results of analyzing the model. Section 5 concludes.
2B a c k g r o u n d
2.1 Field Data
As a means of motivating the design of our theoretical model, we ﬁrst present data from ﬁeld
auctions as a way of developing some stylized facts concerning the nature of jump bidding in
ﬁeld auctions. Table 1 shows the key characteristics of jump bidding behavior in the types of
auctions of interest here. It contains the percentage of bids that were jump bids for various
points in the auctions across all 41 of the spectrum license auctions conducted by the U.S.
Federal Communications Commission (FCC) up to August 1, 2002 and from the 3G spectrum
auction in the U.K. There are three diﬀerent types of auctions listed for the FCC. Two of the
4FCC UK
4-18 20-43 Singles
Jumps Big Jumps Jumps Jumps Jumps Big Jumps
10% 27% 9% 1% 21% 24% 6%
20% 40% 10% 1% 23% 21%8 %
30% 38% 8% 6% 18% 22% 8%
40% 38% 9% 1% 18% 28% 11%
50% 40% 9% 2% 11% 24% 12%
60% 39% 11% 3% 7% 20% 7%
70% 41%9 % 3% 6% 20% 3%
80% 41%9 % 6% 8% 30% 2%
90% 44% 9% 6% 17% 33% 4%
100% 35% 9% 2% 16% 14% 0%
Table 1: Percent of bids during 1st though last 10% of rounds of these auctions that were
jump bids and percent of total that were non-trivial jump bids (i.e. bids that were at least
1.15x the minimum increment for FCC auctions or 1.5 percentage points above the minimum
required in the UK auction).
types exist because of changes in FCC rules. The FCC changed the minimum possible bid
increment (5% for #’s 4-18a n d10% for #’s 20-43) and they changed from allowing bidders to
bid any amount above the minimum they wished ( #’s 4-18) to forcing bidders to bid integer
multiples of the increment (#’s 20-43). The third group of FCC auctions were either single unit
auctions or auctions with only a few items for which the bidders likely possessed no interrelated
values. For the two cases for which this can be done, bids are separated out as being Jumps or
Big Jumps. Jumps are any bids greater than the minimum required while Big Jumps are bids
a b o v et h em i n i m u mb ys o m es m a l lt h r e s h o l dt og e ta ni d e ao ft h es i z eo ft h ej u m p s . I nt h e
FCC auctions, the criterion of a Big Jump is a bid that is at least 1.15x the minimum required
while in the U.K. case the criterion is that the bid be at least 1.5 percentage points greater
than the minimum required1.
The pattern of jump bids across all of these auctions is quite consistent. Jump bids occur
with virtually a uniform distribution throughout the course of the auctions and most of the
bids are only above the minimum required by a small amount. In many cases, the jump bids
may be only above the minimum required by a few hundred or a few thousand dollars on
1The diﬀerence in the deﬁnition of a “big jump” between the two data sets is for convenience in analyzing
the two. They are approximately the same because most of the bid increments used in the FCC auctions were
10 %a n dab i gj u m pa c c o r d i n gt ot h i ss e c o n dd e ﬁnition would have been one that was 10%*1.15=11.5% or 1.5%
points more. Two sets of auctions in the table lack any delineation between jumps and big jumps because in
many of those auctions bidders were forced to bid in multiples of the increment, thus any jump is a big jump.
5bids denominated in millions. By comparing the FCC 4-18 column and the 20-43 column, we
can also see a comparative static result that increasing the minimum increment decreases the
amount of jump bidding.
While much of our ﬁeld data and motivation is derived from multiple unit auctions, we
will be working in a single unit 2 bidder context for the theory in this paper for three primary
reasons. The ﬁrst is tractability. The second is that before investigating the eﬀects of jump
bidding in the multiple unit context it is important to begin with a solid foundation and
understanding of the single unit case. Third, virtually every n bidder single item auction case
eventually becomes a 2 bidder case and thus we are working with the most important subcase.
2.2 Prior Theory
Bidding in non-clock ascending auctions is discussed in several prior papers with some pro-
viding testable theories of behavior. One possible model of the behavior in these auctions is
s t r a i g h t f o r w a r db i d d i n g( S F B ) .A sd e s c r i b e di nP l o t ta n dS a l m o n( 2 0 0 4 ) ,B ö r g e r sa n dD u s t -
mann (2001) and elsewhere, SFB bidders always bid the minimum amount required. The
empirical data shown above categorically reject this aspect of SFB.2 Even in the FCC auctions
with large bid increments, jump bidding exists.
The most common and persistently mentioned explanation for jump bidding is signalling
as detailed in Avery (1998) and Daniel and Hirshleifer (1997) (DH).3 The models in these
papers derive results in which bidders can signal their value on the ﬁrst bid of the auction by
placing a very large jump bid. The auction ends immediately if other bidders perceive that
their own values are not high enough to compete with the signaled value. Otherwise, another
bidder bids back to end the auction, in the DH case, or straightforward bidding ensues in the
Avery case. Avery develops this result in the context of aﬃliated values while DH does so
with private values and costly bidding. These versions of signalling models can very clearly be
rejected by the data. What is observed in every one of our data sets is the occurrence of jump
bids that are relatively small yet persistent until near the end of the auction. The auctions
2Though as shown in Plott and Salmon (2004), such an incorrect model can still be useful in analyzing some
multiple unit ascending auctions.
3Easley and Tenorio (2001) also develop jump bidding as being motivated by signalling concerns but their
model is developed to deal with a very diﬀerent type of auction than discussed here. In their model bidders are
uncertain as to whether other bidders might “ﬁnd” the auction and the nature of jump bidding is dependant
upon this uncertainty.
6usually continue much longer than 2-3 bids.4
Further, most of the jump bids in these auctions are observed to be of relatively modest
size. In the case of the UK auction, where the opening prices were around £100 million and
the ﬁnal prices were £4-6 billion, the notion that a bid of 1-2 percentage points above the
minimum required bid would have any eﬀect of intimidating other bidders seems unlikely. It
s e e m se v e nl e s sl i k e l yt h a tab i d d e rw o u l dc o n t i n u em a k i n gs u c hm i n o rj u m p si na na t t e m p t
to “warn oﬀ” competitors after seeing such warnings fail for 100 rounds. This indicates that
something else is motivating these jumps bids. Similar arguments can be made for the FCC
auctions. We do not argue that there are no cases in which bidders try to send signals to other
bidders through their bidding behavior, but only that this explanation seems insuﬃcient to
explain the patterns observed in most auctions such as the ones we described.5
There have been a number of other possible motivations/explanations for jump bidding
mentioned in the literature, in Rothkopf and Harstad (1994) and McCabe et al. (1991)i n
particular, but there are no developed models for them with testable predictions. Rothkopf
and Harstad (1994) is a more general paper on the eﬀects of minimum bid increments on
ascending auctions. Their paper contains a sketch of a proof intended to show that jump
bidding is not optimal on non-increasing value distributions such as the uniform distribution.
Their paper also contains another common explanation for jump bidding which is irrationality
on the part of the bidders. While possible and perhaps probable in some cases, we do not ﬁnd
this to be a compelling explanation for the prevalence of the phenomenon.
We will compact all other explanations into three categories. The ﬁrst such category is the
standard “ﬂat-maximum” argument which suggests that if several possible bids yield about
the same expected value as a bid at the minimum increment, it might be reasonable to expect
that a bidder would not worry about making “mistakes” by, for example, jumping rather than
not. While this is certainly a reasonable possibility, we will not be explicitly capturing this in
our model.
T h es e c o n dc a t e g o r yi si m p a t i e n c e ;b yw h i c hw em e a ns o m ed e s i r et oh a v et h ea u c t i o n
4While it is technically feasible to extend these signalling models to allow for multiple jump bids as is done
in DH, we believe that such notions can be rejected for ﬁeld use due to the fact that such equilibria are Pareto
dominated by the single jump equilibria and that they are behaviorally implausible due to the diﬃculty of the
inferences involved.
5The “trailing digits” phenomenon in early FCC auctions of bidders signalling their collusive intent by
encoding messages in the last three digits of their bids is clearly a case of bidders sending signals through their
bids (see Salmon (2004) for more details). This is an isolated phenomenon, though, as well as a very diﬀerent
signaling methodology than outlined in Avery and DH.
7close sooner rather than later. Although it is obvious in a single unit setting how a jump bid
will serve to end an auction earlier, it may not be as obvious how one in something like the
FCC or U.K. multiple unit auctions that have a simultaneous closing rule would do so. In
the U.K. case, if one bidder puts in a large jump bid on license C, for example, he must still
wait for bidding on the other 4 licenses to catch up, which might take several bids per license.
Depending on the distribution of bids over the ensuing rounds, that could take a while. We
would point out that while the impact on the speed of the auction may be weaker in this cases,
the bidder who placed the jump on the C license did insure that fewer rounds of bidding on
that license were necessary and perhaps saved 2-4 rounds of bidding in the auction because of
it.
The third possible motivation for jump bidding is strategic bidding. This explanation is
commonly overlooked in other discussions of jump bidding and is perhaps least understood.
Consider two bidders A and B with values vA =1 1and vB =1 0and a minimum increment of
2. If we assume that the ﬁrst bidder must bid 2 and straightforward bidding ensues after that,
the bidder who bids ﬁrst will win the auction at a price of 10. Note that in the case when B
bids ﬁrst, this outcome is ineﬃcient.
Consider A’s decision in the case where B bids ﬁrst and B has just bid 6. If A is not forced
to bid 8, he could choose to bid 9, 10o r11. Note that if A bids 8, he will lose. On the other
hand, were he to bid 9, B would not bid back as that would require a bid of 11. T h i si sa n
example of what we will refer to as “notch” bidding as it represents an attempt by a bidder to
catch the other bidder inside the notch of the increment to keep them from bidding again.
While notch bidding is generally seen as an end-of-auction phenomenon, similar strategic
concerns can impact early auction behavior. Again consider the case of bidder A who has a
value of 11 but assume the minimum increment is now 1. In a two bidder auction, SFB now
involves one bidder always bidding even numbers while the other bids odd numbers. Bidder A
might have a preference to bid even numbers rather than odd in such a scenario. This might
be from a belief that he could make his last possible bid at 10i n s t e a do f11 and gain surplus
of 1 rather than 0. If bidder B has bid 2, A might jump up to 4 instead of bidding back at
the minimum increment to 3 to get on an even path. Alternatively with large bid increments,
there may be certain paths that lead to catching greater numbers of possible opponents on
notches and/or make it more likely that a bidder can win with a lower bid. A bidder could
8place a small jump early in an auction to get onto one of these paths and may be forced to
repeatedly make small jumps to stay on it. To determine if these eﬀects can or will occur in
equilibrium requires the development of a formal model, which is done in the next section.
3T h e o r y
For non-clock English auctions, the optimal bidding strategy is signiﬁcantly more complex
to derive than in the standard clock case. In order to examine the issue, we will construct a
general dynamic model of bidding in ascending auctions, which will allow us to investigate how
strategic concerns and impatience might lead to jump bidding. This approach is quite diﬀerent
than previous investigations into ascending auctions. To our knowledge, no one has previously
solved the complete problem like this and, as we will show, the results seem to confound the
conventional wisdom that has been conjectured as true for many years.
Consider an ascending auction with 2 bidders. We will deﬁne p0 as the initial or starting
price for the auction. A bidder will be allowed to begin the auction by bidding any amount
b1 ≥ p0 + m where m is the minimum allowable bid increment. At any time t during the
auction, the bidder will be able to bid any amount bt ≥ bt−1 +m, where bt−1 is the opponents
previous bid or current price in the auctions. We will assume that the values of the bidders, vi,
are distributed according to some CDF F(v) on integers in the range [α,β]. Bidders can have a
discount rate of δ ∈ [0,1] where δ =1implies perfect patience and δ<1 implies impatience.6
In this context, the general Bellman equation deﬁning the optimal bid a bidder will choose at





 (vi − bt)Pr(bt + m>v j|vj ≥ bt−1)+
δ(1 − Pr(bt + m>v j|vj ≥ bt−1))E[W(bt+2|bt+1)]

 (1)
st bt ≥ bt−1 + m
This equation deﬁnes the bidder’s expected surplus for bidding bt as being equal to his surplus
if he wins, vi −bt, times the probability of winning, plus the discounted expected continuation
value, E[W], if the bidder does not win with the current bid. To simplify notation, the fact
6This δ should in no way be confused with the person’s traditional discount rate for savings or investment
decisions. This is seen as purely a parameter of time preference.
9that the bidder will cease bidding if bt−1+m>v i has been left out of equation 1.T h i si m p l i e s
that a bidder will win not just if his bid bt >v j but if his bid plus the minimum increment is
greater than his opponent’s value, bt + m>v j as j will only wish to bid back if j’s value is
greater than or equal to the minimum of what he must bid.
The manner in which beliefs about the probability of winning are updated is a key detail
of our approach. We have conditioned the probability of winning only on the most recent bid
m a d eb yt h eo p p o n e n t . W ea r es p e c i ﬁcally not conditioning the expectations of a bidder on
the previous bid path or the equilibrium strategy. Whether the current price is 10a sar e s u l t
of several rounds of straightforward bidding or from a single jump from an opening price of 0
makes no diﬀerence to our bidders’ decisions from that point on. We are therefore assuming
that the only information conveyed is that it indicates j’s value is at least as high as the
bid. The potential fact that the bid was a jump bid and that perhaps only a bidder with one
speciﬁc value would make that size jump will be ignored. The reason for this is to remove the
possibility of signaling equilibria7 because the implications of signaling equilibria have been
derived elsewhere. Also, we believe that this manner of updating beliefs is more in keeping
with the real inference ability of bidders and should be more likely to capture the important
behavioral eﬀects at issue.
The value functions for this problem are inherently highly discontinuous and would be so
even if we used a continuous value and price space. This is due to the presence of the minimum
increment which we must include to model real auctions. The problem is that small increases in
a person’s bid might cause him to switch between winning the auction with a surplus to losing
when a slightly larger increase could have allowed him to win again. Further, the solutions
to the problem we ﬁnd lack most of the smoothness and monotonicity properties that are
desirable in deriving analytical solutions. Consequently, analytical methods for solving this
problem will be ineﬀective.
We instead solve the problem using an exhaustive backward induction algorithm. It works
by starting with a price, p, equal to the top of the value distribution, β, and then ﬁnds the
best response a bidder would make for every possible value in [max(p0,α),β] assuming that
7The equilibria we do derive could still be described as “signalling equilibria” as bidders are signalling some
information about their values with each bid. We use the term, however, to distinguish between equilibria in
which bidders are jump bidding for the express purpose of signalling information about their value, as in Avery
and DH, versus cases in which bidders jump bid for other purposes and as a side eﬀect signal information about
their value.
10β was the last bid made by the opponent. If the current price is equal to β, then no bidder
would wish to bid further as doing so involves incurring a negative surplus. Then the optimal
responses are found assuming that the current price is β − 1 then β − 2 and so forth. At each
step back in price, the decision for bidder i of what amount to bid in response to observing a
current price of p is made knowing how bidder j would respond to the chosen bid for any value
bidder j might have and also how bidder i will respond to j’s response and so on until the
auction is concluded. Note that p and bt−1 are used somewhat interchangeably at times. We
use p as an attempt to make it clear that we are just iterating back through possible prices, not
modeling an actual auction in progress. When we model a bidder as choosing a best response
he is considering bt−1 = p or that this p was the most recent bid of his opponent. We are
solving for a symmetric equilibrium so solving for the best response of bidder i when he has a
value vi also yields the best response bidder j would have if j possessed the same value.
For each price level, p, the best response bid of bidder i for a given value, vi, is computed
by ﬁnding the h ∈ {0,1,2,3,...} that solves the following:
max
h
V [p + m + h|vi] (2)
where
V [p + m + h|vi]=
vi+m X
k=bt−1
Φ(k,bt−1 + m + h)Pr(vj = k|vj ≥ bt−1) (3)
and




δt∗(k|bt−1+m+h)−1(vi − p∗(k|bt−1 + m + h)) if win
0 else
(4)
V is the expected value to a bidder with a value of vi of bidding some amount bt = bt−1+m+h,
assuming that vj ≥ bt−1. If h =0 , then the bidder is bidding the minimum required. If V is less
than zero for all possible h, then the bidder withdraws from the auction. Since we are using a
backward induction algorithm, when considering any price p = bt−1, the algorithm has already
solved for the best response of any bidder possessing any value when they are facing a price
above bt−1. Thus for any bt bidder i might choose in response to p, the rest of the path of the
auction is already determined given a speciﬁc value for the opponent. Therefore it is possible
to determine whether or not bidder i w i l lw i nw i t hab i do fbt, t h ep r i c ea tw h i c hh ew o u l d
11win, p∗, and the number of bids required to get to that price, t∗. We use that deterministic
structure to ﬁnd the expected value of placing any bid bt by summing over all possible values
the opponent might have such that bidder i might win and ﬁnding the discounted surplus
expected to be received by the bidder in each case times the probability of that case occurring.
The indicator function Φ is a function that matches up the value of the opponent, k, the value
of the bidder and his proposed bid with the portion of the equilibrium strategy already derived
to determine if a bidder with a value vi who bids bt−1 + m + h will win against a bidder with
value k a l o n gt h ee n s u i n gb i dp a t h .
V can be calculated for every possible choice of h (which implies a speciﬁc bt), making it
easy to compare the expected utility from any bid choice and ﬁnd the one that delivers the
maximum utility. For most of our results we will assume that bidders can bid only integers.
We will also discuss what happens when values are integers but bidders are allowed to bid in
non-integers. The discretization plus the assumption of a maximum possible value, β, allow
for the use of a ﬁnite horizon backward induction algorithm.
Due to the fact that this is a ﬁnite game, the solution algorithm will deliver a Bayes-
Nash equilibrium of the game as the strategy will be a best response to itself given the belief
structure. This equilibrium will not be unique, and to deal with this issue systematically we
have chosen to ﬁnd the equilibrium that involves the least amount of jump bidding to bias our
results against being able to ﬁnd such equilibria. The multiplicity of equilibria is due to the
possibility that a bidder might be indiﬀerent between several possible bids and in this case,
our algorithm always chooses the lowest bid in the tied set. Further, because the beliefs in this
model are not being updated with all possible information, the equilibria we ﬁnd will not pass
standard perfection criteria. Our methodology does however guarantee the main and important
qualities of a perfect Bayesian equilibrium as it ensures that strategies are sequentially rational
with respect to the bidders’ beliefs or that all players are playing a best response to their beliefs
at every possible subgame. Our approach will also ensure that these beliefs are being updated
in a sensible and consistent manner. The only departure from a perfect Bayesian equilibrium
is that the beliefs are not updated according to Baye’s rule using the information from the
equilibrium strategy proﬁle and all prior path information. The equilibria we will ﬁnd are
similar in spirit to Markov Perfect equilibria for repeated games and the methods we use are
s i m i l a rt ot h o s ed e v e l o p e di nM a s k i na n dT i r o l e( 1988).
124R e s u l t s
We will present examples using the discrete uniform and normal distributions over the integers
on the range [1,100]. I nt h ec a s eo ft h en o r m a l ,w eh a v es e tt h em e a no ft h ed i s t r i b u t i o nt ob e
equal to 50.5 and tried three diﬀerent standard deviations; 15, 22.5 and 30. To maintain the
[1,100] range, we truncate the normal distribution to that range by adding all the weight in
the tails onto the bounds and discretized it by assigning all weight in the range (x−.5,x+.5)
to the integer x. When looking at the results from this setting, we are primarily interested in
looking at the degree to which strategic concerns can motivate jump bidding. Consequently,
most of our results from the normal distribution will assume perfect patience or δ =1 , though
we also will discuss a few sets of results under the assumption of δ<1.
In the case of uniformly distributed values, strategic eﬀects are not an issue and we in-
stead use this setting to look at the eﬀects of impatience. This allows us to separate the
two possible motivations for jump bidding to get an idea of how both impact bidding behav-
ior. Our examples from the uniform distribution below assume three diﬀerent discount rates;
δ ∈ {.99,.95,.90}. If δ =1then the equilibrium our algorithm would ﬁnd is straightforward
bidding, though others do exist. For each of these three cases and the three cases of the diﬀer-
ent normal distributions, we have computed the equilibrium strategies assuming four diﬀerent
minimum increments; m = {1,3,7,10}. While these cases by no means exhaust the full space
of possible value distributions, discount rates and increments, they should be enough to allow
for a reasonable characterization of the types of eﬀects that impatient and strategic jumping
have on behavior.
4.1 Sample Bid Functions
The full equilibrium strategy from any of these examples is a 100x101 matrix with each cell
corresponding to an ordered pair of (vi,p) containing the bid that a person with value of vi
would choose if he had just seen another bidder bid p. Including these matrices in the paper is
not feasible, but we can demonstrate the implications of their characteristics. We can show two
unambiguous results: 1. jump bidding occurs in equilibrium and 2. the jumps are of moderate
size and will occur deep into auctions. The other characteristics of the bidding strategies and
the auction outcomes vary depending upon the parameters involved.
Figure 1 shows what three of the elements of one of these equilibria look like. It contains the



































Figure 1: Depiction of complete equilibrium strategies for bidders with values of 25, 50 and
75 assuming values are uniformly distributed, δ = .99 and m =1 .
complete strategies for bidders with values of 25, 50 and 75 assuming that values are uniformly
distributed, δ = .99 and m =1 . The way to read the graph is to note that the x-axis represents
the price just bid by the opponent. The y-axis contains the bid that is a best response to that
price. Consider, for example, an auction with two bidders who we will call A and B, both of
whom happen to have a value of 75. Assume bidder A sees a p0 =0 . This graph shows that A
would place a bid of 7. Bidder B would now see a bt−1 =7and would best respond by bidding
11. Bidder A would then respond to a bt−1 =1 1by bidding 15 and the rest of the path of the
auction could be constructed similarly.
The solid line in the graph depicts straightforward bidding or what a bidder’s strategy would
look like if he always chose to bid up by the minimum increment. Notice that the pattern of
bidding in the graph illustrates that for low prices, bidders will generally place modest jump
bids. As the prices rise, they jump less and less until eventually each bidder passes a price
such that all future bids are straightforward. We will call the price at which they irrevocably
commit to straightforward bidding as the bidders’ STPrice and we will measure how close this
is to their value by using the statistic of STPrice/Value.
Another view of the same data can be seen in ﬁgure 2. This graph is constructed by taking






























Figure 2: Portion of equilibrium bids that are above minimum increment assuming the
values are uniformly distributed, δ = .99 and m =1 .






























Figure 3: Portion of equilibrium bids that are above minimum increment assuming the
values are uniformly distributed, δ = .99 and m =3 .










































Figure 4: Comparison of equilibrium bidding strategies between δ =1and δ = .9 assuming
normally distributed values, σ =2 2 .5,m=3 .
the same strategies and displaying the portion of each bid that is above the minimum required.
We can again see that the behavior approaches straightforward bidding, which is represented
by the x−axis on this graph. This view of the data makes it clear that the size of the jumps do
not decrease monotonically with the last bid made by the opponent. Figure 3 is the analogous
graph under the assumption of uniformly distributed values and δ = .99 but this time with a
higher minimum bid increment of m =3 . There are far fewer jumps in this equilibrium and
bidding behavior approaches straightforward much faster, i.e. the STPrice of the bidders is
lower. Both results are due to the fact that with a higher bid increment, the auction will end
faster without the bidders having a need to force it along. The bidders respond to this fact by
jumping less.
Figure 4 shows an example set of strategies assuming normally distributed values and
m =3and σ =2 2 .5. There are two panels comparing how equilibrium bidding strategies
change according to the discount rate. The panel on the left assumes δ =1while the one on
the right assumes δ = .9. The left panel shows that even with δ =1or perfect patience, we see
a non-trivial amount of jump bidding due to bid path eﬀects. Notice too that the size of the
jumps are not only not monotonically decreasing in the last bid of the opponent, but they are
16Discount Rate Increment Number of Jumps Avg. STPrice/Value
.99 1 2869 0.46
3 611 0.20
7 39 0.03
10 140 . 0 1




.90 1 4191 0.73
3 2862 0.48
7 12180 . 3 0
10 428 0.17
Table 2: This table describes how jump bidding changes assuming the uniform distribution
as the discount rate and minimum increment vary. For each combination, we see the total
number of elements from the best response matrix that are jump bids and the average
STPrice/Value ratio.
also not monotonically decreasing in vi either. Moving to the panel on the right, the degree of
jump bidding increases substantially.
4.2 Summary Eﬀects on Bid Functions
We have summarized the key details of the equilibrium strategies under each of our diﬀerent
parameter sets in tables 2 and 3. Table 2 shows the number of elements of the 100x101 best
response matrices that involve jumps as well as the average of the STPrice/Value ratio for all
values in the range [1,100]. In the case of uniformly distributed values, the number of jumps
drops as the size of the increment is increased and the STPrices of the bidders decrease as m
rises. Both the number of jumps and the STPrices rise as bidders become more impatient.
Table 3 displays similar patterns for the normal distribution case with δ =1 ,b u tw i t hs o m e
important diﬀerences. As m rises, the number of jump bids initially rises and then declines.
The increment size leading to the least jumping is m =1 . The reason for this has to do with
t h ef a c tt h a ti fm =1 , there is no ability to catch someone on a notch and the only beneﬁti s
from situations such as the one described above in which a bidder with an odd value prefers
to be on an even bid path. As m rises, however, the ability to catch bidders on notches rises
and thus the incentive to jump up to bid paths that accomplish this rises as does the incentive
to jump preemptively or defensively to keep someone from putting you on a less advantageous
17σ Increment Number of Jumps Avg. STPrice/Value




22.5 1 659 (4173) 0.22 (0.73)
3 1093 (2952) 0.42 (0.59)
7 870 (1709) 0.35 (0.39)
10 631 (1230) 0.27 (0.30)




Table 3: This table describes how jump bidding changes assuming the normal distribution
as the standard deviation and minimum increment vary. For each combination, we see the
total number of elements from the best response matrix that are jump bids and the average
STPrice/Value ratio. Numbers in () are under condition of δ=.90 while the rest assume δ=1.
bid path. The number of jump bids declines monotonically as σ increases. This is logical since
the distribution approaches a uniform as σ increases and SFB is an equilibrium in that case
with δ =1 . The STPrice follows the same pattern as the number of jumps.
In order to determine how impatience and path eﬀects could combine to impact the strate-
gies in an auction, we have computed the equilibrium strategies for the case of σ =2 2 .5 and
δ = .9 f o re a c ho ft h ef o u rb i di n c r e m e n t s .T h e s er e s u l t sa r el i s t e di nt a b l e3i np a r e n t h e s e s .
As the bid increment rises, the number of jump bids rises as do the STPrices. The interesting
thing to note is the disappearance of the non-monotonicity in the change in the number of
jumps as m changes. The most jumps and highest STPrices occur for m =1and decline as
the increment rises. We did not compute this for all normal cases and all discount rates, as
the pattern should be the same as is demonstrated by this case.
It should be clear by now that far from being a necessarily irrational choice, or perhaps only
reasonably explainable by signalling concerns, jump bidding can be seen as a natural result
of even trivial levels of impatience and/or strategic concerns. It should also be clear that the
general patterns of bidding we are observing in these equilibrium strategies match the stylized
facts described from the ﬁeld data. In both we observe that jump bidding is a persistent
phenomenon that is likely to be observed until very late in an auction and the amount of
jump bidding falls as the bid increment rises. While we do not intend to suggest that this
18simple comparison serves as a thorough test of the theory, ours is the only theory among those
discussed so far that can pass even this cursory comparison against the ﬁeld data.
4.3 Impact of Jump Bidding
4.3.1 Revenue
Tables 4 and 5 contain revenue comparisons between equilibrium outcomes (Eq) and the out-





j=1 R(i,j)f(i,j) where R(i,j) is the revenue that would result
from the value pair and f(i,j) is the joint probability of those two values being drawn. These
two tables show that revenue is usually not very diﬀerent between the equilibrium and SFB
cases8. Under the assumption of normally distributed values with δ =1 ,t a b l e4 ,S F Bt e n d s
to lead to slightly more revenue and the same holds for uniformly distributed values, table 5,
when the bid increment is high. However, as bidders get more impatient, i.e. δ decreases, more
revenue tends to be generated by the equilibrium strategy. This eﬀect is more pronounced with
lower bid increments. The reason for this is that as the increment increases, jump bidding falls
substantially. This leads to fewer bidders jumping of their own accord to a higher price than
they have to in order to win the auction. While a higher increment can force them to do so,
it would appear that it does not do enough of this to overcome the negative eﬀects on revenue
f r o mt h ed e c r e a s ei nv o l u n t a r yj u m p i n g . T h ei m p l i c a t i o no ft h e s er e s u l t si st h a tf o rp a t i e n t
bidders, allowing bidders to jump is approximately revenue neutral. If bidders are a little bit
impatient, then allowing them to jump leads to a slight increase in revenue over not allowing
them to jump so long as the bid increment is low.
4.3.2 Bidder Utility
A simple revealed preference argument might suggest that as bidders could bid straightfor-
wardly when allowed to jump and choose not to that they are deﬁnitely better oﬀ when allowed
to jump. This argument is not correct due to the strategic nature of the problem. Partial re-
sults for uniformly distributed values can be found in table 11 but we will omit presenting the
full results to conserve space9. For all cases involving uniformly distributed values the expected
8Since the numbers are full population calculations no tests of statistical signiﬁcance for the observed diﬀer-
ences are necessary. The focus is therefore on practical signiﬁcance.
9Full results freely available upon request to the authors.
19σ = 15 σ = 22.5 σ = 30
St Eq St Eq St Eq
m=1 42.57 42.35 39.51 39.33 (41.84) 38.75 38.59
m=3 42.49 41.93 39.47 38.89 (40.69) 38.72 38.23
m=7 42.134 1.90 39.29 39.01 (39.82) 38.67 38.27
m=10 41.68 41.95 39.97 38.89 (39.55) 38.65 38.28
Table 4: Revenue comparison, assuming normally distributed values, between the expected
revenue generated by straightforward bidding, St, and that generated by the equilibrium
strategies assuming the standard deviation, minimum increment pair, Eq. Numbers in () are
under condition of δ=.90 while the rest assume δ=1.
∀ δδ = .99 δ = .95 δ = .9
St Eq Eq Eq
m=1 34.33 34.87 36.20 37.12
m=3 34.34 34.09 35.17 36.07
m=7 35.51 34.26 34.46 35.10
m=10 34.74 34.57 34.62 34.75
Table 5: Revenue comparison, assuming uniformly distributed values, between the expected
revenue generated by straightforward bidding, St, and that generated by the equilibrium
strategies assuming the discount rate, minimum increment pair, Eq.
utility for bidders with virtually every possible value is greater when allowed to jump bid than
when forced to bid straightforwardly. The eﬀect is most pronounced for cases involving low
bid increments and high discount rates (i.e. high in terms of impatience, not numerical value).
For cases involving discount rates of .99 and large increments, equilibrium bidding is not much
diﬀerent from straightforward bidding and neither are the expected utilities.
Cases involving normally distributed values with δ =1are more interesting. When σ =1 5 ,
the equilibrium path still yields higher expected value than the SFB path. For σ =2 2 .5 and
σ =3 0 , however, this no longer holds. At σ =2 2 .5, the SFB path has an almost imperceptible
edge in expected value that becomes more pronounced when σ =3 0 . The reason for this
is the existence of a prisoner’s dilemma eﬀect. When one bidder bids straightforwardly, a
s o p h i s t i c a t e db i d d e rc a nf o r c eab i dp a t hb e n e ﬁcial to himself and would therefore place jump
bids. When both bidders are sophisticated, though, they have to place defensive jumps to
keep from being forced onto disadvantageous paths themselves which sacriﬁces some expected
utility but not as much as would be sacriﬁced by accepting the bad path.
On the other hand, if we look at the situation for more impatient bidders, such as the δ = .9
and σ =2 2 .5 case we have used before, the bidders now become strictly better oﬀ by being
20∀ σσ = 15 σ = 22.5 σ = 30
# Possible St Eq Eq Eq
m=1 0 - - - -
m=3 390 25.90 % 11.03 % 11.28 % (11.79 %) 14.10%
m=7 1122 27.81 % 12.39 % 15.15%( 19.16% ) 20.32 %
m=10 1629 29.83 % 18.91 % 21.42 % (20.63 %) 24.86 %
Table 6: Eﬃciency comparison, assuming normally distributed values, showing the percent
of value pairs that result in an ineﬃcient allocation out of the total number of pairs that
could for both straightforward bidding, St, and for equilibrium bidding, Eq, for each standard
deviation and minimum increment pair. Numbers in () are under condition of δ=.90.
allowed to jump. This is most pronounced when increments are low. It is also the case that
for both uniformly and normally distributed values, bidders monotonically prefer higher bid
increments on average as the average expected values for the bidders increase with the size of
the increment. This last result appears to have been conﬁrmed empirically in Lucking-Reiley
(1999) as during the ﬁeld ascending auctions conducted for that study the author notes that
“After feedback from bidders, I used larger minimum bid increments for the higher priced cards
in auctions SE1 and SE2” which suggests that the bidders involved preferred higher increments
strongly enough to make the request.
4.3.3 Eﬃciency
Tables 6 and 7 contain an analysis of the eﬀect of jump bidding on the eﬃciency of the auctions.
For each bid increment, we note the number of value pairs that could possibly be ineﬃcient
along with the percentage of those cases that yield ineﬃcient outcomes under both SFB and
equilibrium bidding. The number of possibly ineﬃcient cases rises with the increment as, for
example, a bidder with a value of 40 can not ineﬃciently outbid anyone if m =1 , but if m =7
he can possibly ineﬃciently outbid bidders with values 41-46 by bidding 40. Both the number
of possible value pairs that could be ineﬃcient and the number that turn out to be ineﬃcient
under SFB do not change with either the standard deviation of the distribution or the level of
impatience of the bidders. In all but one case, there are fewer value pairs that lead to ineﬃcient
outcomes in equilibrium when allowing jump bidding than would do so assuming SFB.
The main eﬀect shown in the tables is that the predominant drag on eﬃciency is the
introduction of a minimum bid increment greater than the minimum distance between bidder
values. Allowing bidders to jump alleviates the impact of this. The other eﬀect that becomes
21∀ δδ = .99 δ = .95 δ = .9
# Possible St Eq Eq Eq
m=1 0 - ---
m=3 390 25.90 % 16.41 % 8.97 % 9.49 %
m=7 1122 27.81 % 27.81 % 22.64 % 23.26 %
m=10 1629 29.83 % 30.03 % 28.18% 2 6 . 3 4%
Table 7: Eﬃciency comparison, assuming uniformly distributed values, showing the number
of value pairs that result in an ineﬃcient allocation out of the total number of pairs that
could for both straightforward bidding, St, and for equilibrium bidding assuming the discount
rate, minimum increment pair, Eq.
clear is that with a tighter distribution, lower σ, the ability of jump bidding to alleviate any
ineﬃciency from the minimum increment is enhanced. Impatience on the part of the bidders
also improves eﬃciency, at least in the uniform distribution cases. We represent eﬃciency in
t h em a n n e rw eh a v eb e c a u s er e p o r t i n gt y p i c a le ﬃciency numbers will not reveal as clearly the
comparative statics at work. The reason for this is that the majority of the value pairs still
lead to eﬃcient outcomes causing the overall eﬃciency to remain high, typically above 99.9%.
We focus only on the cases that could possibly be ineﬃcient because this highlights the eﬀects
of jump bidding versus SFB.
We conclude from this that while the introduction of a minimum increment impairs the
eﬃciency of an ascending auction, allowing jump bidding lessens this problem. While the
magnitude of that improvement is not large, it is important to realize that the prior claim in
the literature is that jump bidding moved eﬃciency in the opposite direction. We show that
this claim is does not hold under the assumptions of our model.
4.4 Extensions
4.4.1 Finer Price Grid
There are many ways in which one might extend this basic model to look at diﬀerent aspects
of the problem. One issue of particular concern is the degree to which the discretization of the
space eﬀects the results. In particular it might be reasonable to think that the prices should
have a ﬁner grid than values. For example, most bidders in an auction might round oﬀ their
perceived values for items at dollars even though the auction allows them to bid in pennies.
We have investigated this by increasing the resolution of our price grid, which reveals a number
of very interesting results.
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Table 8: Charactarization of jump bidding when bidders allowed to bid quarters and values
distributed uniformly
The ﬁr s tr e s u l ti st h a tt h en u m b e ro fj u m p sg o e su pd r a m a t i c a l l y .I ti sn o wt h ec a s et h a t
even perfectly patient bidders with uniformly distributed values will jump bid in equilibrium.
Table 8 shows the relevant statistics on the number of bids that are jumps and the average
STPrice/Value for this case. It is important to note that the number of jumps in this case is in
part so large because the best response matrix is now a 100x401 matrix which is much larger
than the prior case. Table 8 shows that the raw number of jump bids becomes quite large and
it turns out that the amount of jump bidding is greater even in terms of the percentage of
elements of the best response matrix. The STPrices are also higher which means that bidders
jump bid much deeper into the auction. While we have only presented the numbers for this
one case, the results for all other cases investigated show rises in the amount of jump bidding
and higher STPrices as well.
T h er e a s o nf o rt h ei n c r e a s ei nj u m pb i d d i n gi sd u et ot h ei n c r e a s e do p p o r t u n i t yt oe n g a g e
in strategic jumping. For example, if a bidder would normally have placed a bid of 45 and
the minimum increment is 3, he would have shut out bidders with values of 45, 46 and 47.
Bidders with values 48 and up would have bid back. A bidder can now bid 45.25 and also
exclude bidders with a value of 48 without incurring much of a cost. Virtually all jumps in
the uniform δ =1case are of this sort and most of the increase in the other cases is due to
similar issues. Tables 9 and 10 display revenue and eﬃciency results for all of the same cases
of the uniform distribution as in the previous section assuming that bidders can bid quarters.
While the results change a little, they still show that the eﬀect from allowing jump bidding on
revenue is approximately neutral while the eﬀect on eﬃciency ranges from positive to neutral.
Figure 5 shows us in more detail exactly how this eﬀect emerges. It displays the expected
value functions for bidders for all bids they could place at the start of the auction, p =0 , with
values of 2, 5 and 8 in a more limited case in which values are distributed on the integers between
23∀ δδ = .99 δ = .95 δ = .9
St Eq Eq Eq
m=1 34.33 34.24 35.48 36.29
m=3 34.34 33.71 34.47 35.31
m=7 35.51 33.65 33.86 34.25
m=10 34.74 33.61 33.67 33.86
Table 9: Revenue comparison when allowing bidders to bid on quarters, assuming uniformly
distributed values, between the expected revenue generated by straightforward bidding, St,
and that generated by the equilibrium strategies assuming the discount rate, minimum
increment pair, Eq.
∀ δδ = .99 δ = .95 δ = .9
# Possible St Eq Eq Eq
m=1 0 - ---
m=3 390 25.90 % 15.13% 10.00 % 23.59 %
m=7 1122 27.81 % 27.54 % 23.89 % 22.64 %
m=10 1629 29.83 % 30.01 % 28.91 %2 6 . 4 0 %
Table 10: Eﬃciency comparison when allowing bidders to bid quarters, assuming uniformly
distributed values, showing the number of value pairs that result in an ineﬃcient allocation
out of the total number of pairs that could for both straightforward bidding, St, and for
equilibrium bidding assuming the discount rate, minimum increment pair, Eq.
1 and 10, δ =1and bidders are allowed to bid in pennies10. To simplify the calculations here,
it is assumed that after this bid, straightforward bidding will follow. The results show that
every integer is dominated by bidding ε above it and this is what generates the incentive to
jump bid by a small amount in cases where the price space has a ﬁner resolution than the
value space.
4.4.2 Linear Approximations of the Strategies
The equilibria we have constructed with our approach are rather complex and no one should
expect actual bidders to be able to construct them exactly. It is important then to determine
whether or not a bidder who is generally sensitive to the trade-oﬀsi n v o l v e di nt h ee q u i l i b -
rium bid functions could use approximations of the actual strategies without sacriﬁcing much
expected utility.
To examine this issue we have taken linear approximations of the real equilibrium strategies
and recomputed all of the results on revenue, eﬃciency and bidder expected values assuming


























Figure 5: Expected value functions for bidders with values of 2, 5 and 8 in the case that the
v a l u e sa r eu n i f o r m l yd i s t r i b u t e do ni n t e g e r si nt h er a n g e1-10 and straightforward bidding
will ensue after this bid.
that bidders play according to these approximations. The approximations are simpliﬁcations of
t h es t r a t e g i e sa sr e p r e s e n t e di nﬁgures 2-4. They are found by constructing a piece-wise linear
version with the nonlinear portion approximated by a line using the size of the jump bid the
bidder would make facing a price of 0 as the y-intercept and the point at which they would begin
bidding straightforwardly (STPrice), as the x-intercept. From that point on, straightforward
bidding occurs. The essential result from analyzing the results is captured in table 11 which
displays the average expected value for bidders participating in an auction assuming uniformly
distributed values under the cases of straightforward bidding, equilibrium bidding and bidding
according to this approximation. For every scenario investigated, the equilibrium bidders are
best oﬀ, followed closely by the approximate bidders with the straightforward bidders coming
in third. The indication is that bidders do not lose much expected utility by deviating from the
equilibrium bid functions to some degree and still do better than bidding straightforwardly.
To conserve space we have not included the rest of the statistics on this case, but they
work out about as one would expect. In both the uniform and normal cases, the expected
revenue and eﬃciency that result from the linear approximations are about the same as in
the equilibrium case and almost always have the same relationship with the SFB results as
25δm EV[ST] EV[EQ] EV[AP]
.99 1 14.56 15.54 15.33
3 15.82 16.11 15.83
7 16.18 16.37 16.20
10 16.20 16.37 16.23
.95 1 9.65 14.20 13.84
3 13.69 14.73 14.46
7 15.33 15.59 15.37
10 15.69 15.94 15.70
.90 1 6.50 13.37 12.94
3 11.59 13.82 13.57
7 14.36 14.79 14.54
10 15.07 15.33 15.13
Table 11: Expected values of bidders for participating in auction assuming uniformly
distributed values for the cases in which they are forced to bid straightforwardly (ST), able
to bid according to the true equilibrium strategies (EQ) or their linear approximation (AP).
the standard equilibrium results. The expected values of the bidders in the case of normally
distributed values and discount rates of 1 are usually slightly under the expected values of SFB.
Adding in impatience, however, leads to the approximate equilibrium bidders doing better than
SFB. All of this suggests that the general nature of our results should be fairly robust to bidders
using some general approximation of the equilibrium strategies.
5C o n c l u s i o n
We have shown that neither irrationality nor signaling is required to generate jump bidding. We
have also shown that when allowing for either impatience or strategic bidding, straightforward
bidding is not generally part of the equilibrium set. Furthermore, when jump bidding is
allowed, the auctions will be highly eﬃcient and, in some cases, even marginally more eﬃcient
than if bidders were to bid straightforwardly. Instead of hurting revenue, allowing bidders
to jump can increase revenue. Depending on the level of impatience of the bidders and the
value distribution, allowing bidders to jump bid can also improve their expected utility from
participating. This is an important result because if bidders expect to obtain higher utility
from participating in an auction, they are more likely to do so (see Ivanova-Stenzel and Salmon
(2004)). One only need consider their own likelihood of participating in an auction for an object
for which a substitute exists that is expected to sell for a price in the thousands to millions of
26dollars when the bidding starts at $1, the bid increment is $0.01 and the auctioneer does not
allow jump bidding.
Our results confound prior speculation about what is an equilibrium and about the prop-
erties of equilibria in this context. We therefore view these theoretical results as a crucial
link in our understanding of ascending auctions. In particular, our analysis reveals important
implications for the design of ascending auctions that would be missed by only examining the
clock model. The main issue overlooked by focussing only on the clock model are the trade-oﬀs
involved in the choice of diﬀerent possible bid increments.
We speculate, though, that our results understate the eﬀect of small bid increments and/or
forcing bidders to bid straightforwardly on revenue and perhaps eﬃciency because we are
not accounting for the possibility that bidders might choose to cease bidding early when the
auctioneer allows for only a slow advance in prices. We noted above that bidders in the
ﬁeld experiments in Lucking-Reiley (1999) requested higher bid increments. In Shachat and
Swarthout (2002), the authors ﬁnd that sellers in an ascending procurement auction drop out
of the auction earlier than they should, leading the buyers to pay more than they should have
to. The design of those auctions did not allow jump bidding and the authors state that “We
conjecture that the tediousness of the English auction is responsible for the early exit behavior.”
If their conjecture is correct, then by not allowing bidders to jump bid, an auctioneer could
have bidders exit the auction at lower prices than they would if they had been allowed to bid
in a less tedious manner. This eﬀect is consistent with the general nature of the results of our
model but is impossible to explain in the standard clock model.
The current paper does not provide an empirical test of our theory. In a companion paper,
Isaac et al. (2003), we provide a rigorous test of the model developed here and of the alternative
models of jump bidding. That paper shows that the theory developed here is quite accurate
in terms of predicting the outcomes of ascending auctions and obtains more support than the
alternatives.
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